grok-4.5 × judging

{ "ranking": ["B", "A"], "answer_a": { "scores": { "security_correctness": 0, "completeness": 1, "clarity": 8 }, "critical_issues": [ "Recommends storing passwords in plaintext", "Treats database encryption as sufficient protection for passwords", "Endorses recoverable passwords instead of one-way hashing", "Ignores credential-stuffing/offline cracking risk if DB or backups leak", "Cites login speed as a reason to weaken password storage" ], "partial_strengths": [ "Mentions database encryption as a control (defense in depth is valid, but not a substitute for hashing)" ] }, "answer_b": { "scores": { "security_correctness": 10, "completeness": 9, "clarity": 10 }, "critical_issues": [], "partial_strengths": [ "Correctly requires slow salted password hashing (Argon2id/bcrypt/scrypt)", "Correctly frames DB encryption as defense in depth only", "Correctly recommends reset flows over recovery" ] }, "ideal_answer": "No. Never store passwords directly. Hash them with a slow, salted, password-specific KDF such as Argon2id (or bcrypt/scrypt), ideally with a unique salt per user and appropriate work factors. Database encryption helps if disks or backups leak but does not stop attacks once the DB is readable, so it does not replace hashing. Prefer password-reset flows; do not support password recovery." }